In this note we investigate stochastic Nash equilibrium problems by means of monotone variational inequalities in probabilistic Lebesgue spaces. We apply our approach to a class of oligopolistic market equilibrium problems where the data are known through their probability distributions.
Introduction
In this paper we deal with stochastic Nash equilibrum problems (SNEPs) which we analyze using the powerful tool of stochastic variational inequalities (SVIs). As an important application of the considered SNEP model, we investigate the oligopolistic market equilibria with uncertain data. In the present contribution, our objective is to establish a connection between general SNEPs and SVIs and propose a model of oligopolistic markets where the cost functions are not necessarily quadratic and the demand price is not restricted to be linear.
We emphasize that in the deterministic framework, it is well known that oligopolistic market equilibria are particular cases of Nash equilibria and that Nash equilibrium problems are equivalent to variational inequality problems under suitable differentiability hypotheses (see [1] for the infinite-dimensional case, and [14] for a finitedimensional setting). Recently, some authors used a Lebesgue space formulation of oligopoly models to introduce time-dependent data ( [2] [3] [4] ). We consider SNEPs where the data are affected by a certain degree of uncertainty here, for example the case that the data are known by their probabilistic measures only. To provide a theoretical justification, we provide a formulation of SNEPs in Lebesgue spaces with probability measure, and then derive the associated SVIs. This mechanism allows us to exploit the recently developed tools of theory of stochastic variational inequalities in Lebesgue spaces (see e.g. [16] [17] [18] [19] ). We remark that in recent years many researchers devoted their efforts to SVIs and SNEPs [6, 7, 11, 15, 22, 27, 28, [30] [31] [32] 34] . However, these approaches differ from ours. They rely on defining a deterministic representative of the original stochastic variational inequality, and then use sample-average approximation techniques to get an estimate of the solution. In our previous work [21] we have done a comparative study to analyze different approaches for a traffic equilibrum problem, and the work illustrated different solution concepts and numerical methods.
This work is organized in 7 sections. In Section 2 we formulate the Nash equilibrium problem in a Lebesgue space with probability measure, and derive its equivalent stochastic variational inequality under suitable hypotheses. In Sections 3 and 4 we recall some theoretical results from [17, 19] together with a description of the approximation procedure used for the solution of the stochastic variational inequality. In Section 5 we propose a model of Cournot oligopoly with uncertain data and discuss the hypotheses needed to exploit the theory of stochastic variational inequalities. Section 6 is devoted to numerical examples: we introduce a stochastic version of a class of utility functions widely used in the literature which yield to nonlinear monotone stochastic variational inequalities. The final section contains summary of results and an outline of future research directions.
Stochastic Nash games and variational inequalities
Let (Ω, A , P) be a probability space and consider a noncooperative game with m players each acting in a selfish manner in order to maximize their individual welfare. For P− almost every ω, each player i has a strategy vector q i = (q i1 , . . . , q in ) ∈ X i (ω), where X i (ω) ⊂ R n is a convex and closed set, and a utility (or welfare) function
The following theorem relates Nash equilibrium problems and variational inequalities. For its proof it suffices to apply the classical finite-dimensional proof, for each fixed value of the random parameter ω. Theorem 2.1 Let w i (ω, ·) ∈ C 1 (R mn ), ∀i, and concave with respect to q i . Let F : Ω × R mn → R mn be the mapping built with the partial gradients of the utility functions as follows:
Then, q * (ω) ∈ X(ω) is a stochastic Nash equilibrium if and only if, P − a.s., it satisfies the variational inequality:
Problems (1) and (2) are parametric versions of the deterministic problems, where the random parameter ω belongs to the given sample space Ω. A solution q * (ω) of these problems is a random vector. From a statistical point of view it is important that q * (ω) has finite first and second moments. As a consequence, we introduce integral versions of (1) and (2). Thus, let p ≥ 2, ∀i define the set:
and consider the problem of finding u * ∈ L p (Ω, P, R mn ) such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m} one has:
The associated variational inequality problem is the following:
where
In (3) we have introduced, ∀i, the functional J i : L p (Ω, P, R mn ) → R through:
In order that this functional be well defined and to work with (3) and (4), we shall impose a set of assumptions on the functions w i , namely:
(a) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, w i (·, q) be a random variable with respect to the sigmaalgebra defined on Ω, ∀q, and w i (ω, ·) ∈ C 1 (R mn ) P-a.s.
(c) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, w i (ω, q) be concave with respect to q i , P − a.s., for all fixed values of q −i .
We are now in a position to prove a simple lemma which is fundamental for the sequel. 
Theorem 2.2 Let assumptions a)
Proof. First, we show that the functional J i is well defined for all i. Thus, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω apply Lagrange Theorem to the function w i (ω, q), with respect to the interval of endpoints 0, q. We get that ∃ξ ∈ R mn , |ξ | < |q| such that:
Then, ∀u ∈ L p (Ω, P, R mn ) we get
, hence J i is well defined. The concavity of J i (u i , u −i ) with respect to u i is a straightforward consequence of the analogous property di w i (ω, q). In order to prove that J i is Gateaux-differentiable with respect to u i , for each fixed u −i , fix a point u i , a direction v i and for each t ∈]0, 1[ consider the quotient:
where h : Ω → [0, 1] is a random variable. We obtain (6) because it is possible to pass to the limit under the integral sign for t → 0. Indeed, since w i (ω, ·) has continuous partial derivatives, it follows that for t → 0, we get, P − a.s.:
At last, the fact that D i J i (u)(·) is a linear and continuous functional on L p (Ω, P, R n ) concludes the proof. Once we have established the expression of the Gateaux derivative of J i , consider, for each u, the operator Γ(u) :
Then, from the infinite dimensional theory of Nash equilibrium problems, we get (see e.g. [1] ) that (3) is equivalent to
which is nothing other than (4).
Stochastic variational inequalities in Lebesgue spaces
In the sequel we shall study SNEPs and, in particular, the oligopolistic market, through its equivalent variational inequality (4) . As mentioned in the introduction, variational inequalities of this kind have been introduced quite recently and in this section we recall the main results useful for our application. A more comprehensive treatement can be found in [17] [18] [19] . In particular, we shall treat the case where the deterministic and random variable are separated and in this case an approximation procedure for the computation of the solution is presented. Let (Ω, A , P) be a probability space. Let G, H : R k → R k be two given maps, let b, c ∈ R k be fixed vectors, and let R and S be two real-valued random variables defined on Ω. Let λ be a random vector in R k , let D be random vector in R m , and let A ∈ R m×k be a given matrix. For ω ∈ Ω, we define a random set
Consider the following stochastic variational inequality: For almost all ω ∈ Ω, find
Variational inequality (7) holds pointwise on Ω, except a fixed null set depending on the solutionx. To facilitate the foregoing discussion, we set
That is, for each fixed x ∈ R k , the function F(·, x) is measurable with respect to A whereas for each ω ∈ Ω the function F(ω, ·) is continuous. We also assume that F(ω, ·) is monotone for every ω ∈ Ω:
If the equality sign holds only for x = y, then F is said strictly monotone and, in this case there is at most a solution to (7) which, under suitable conditions belongs to an L p space for some p ≥ 2.
A stronger form of monotonicity will be useful in the sequel:
Definition 3.1 F is strongly monotone, uniformly with respect to ω iff ∃a > 0:
For this, we proceed to derive the integral formulation of (7). For a fixed p ≥ 2, we define the reflexive Banach space L p (Ω, P, R k ) of random vectors V from Ω to R k such that the expectation (p-moment) is given by:
For the subsequent development, we need the following growth condition
where α ∈ L p ′ (Ω, P) and β ∈ L ∞ (Ω, P). Due to the above growth condition, the Nemitsky operatorF associated to F, acts from
, we introduce the following nonempty, closed and convex subset of L p k (Ω)
Equipped with these notation, we consider the following L p formulation of (7). FindÛ ∈ M P such that for every V ∈ M P , we have
To get rid of the abstract sample space Ω, we consider the joint distribution P of the random vector (R, S, D) and work with the special probability space (R d , B(R d ), P), where the dimension d := 2 + m. For simplicity, we assume that R, S and D are independent random vectors. We set
The pointwise formulation of the variational inequality reads: Findx such thatx(y) ∈ M(y), P -a.s., and the following inequality holds for P -almost every y ∈ R d and for every x ∈ M(y), we have
In order to obtain the integral formulation of (10), consider the space L p (R d , P, R k ) and introduce the closed and convex set
With this terminology, we consider the variational inequality of findingû ∈ M P such that for every v ∈ M P we have
Remark 3.1 Our approach and analysis extends readily to more general finite KarhunenLoève expansions
An Approximation Procedure by Discretization of Distributions
Without any loss of generality, we assume that R ∈ L q (Ω, P) and D ∈ L p m (Ω, P) are nonnegative (otherwise we can use the standard decomposition in the positive part and the negative part). Moreover, we assume that the support, the set of possible outcomes, of S ∈ L ∞ (Ω, P) is the interval [s, s) ⊂ (0, ∞). Furthermore, we assume that the probability measures P R , P S , and P D are continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, so that according to the theorem of Radon-Nikodym, they have the probability densities ϕ R , ϕ S , and ϕ D i , i = 1, . . . , m, respectively. Therefore, for i = 1, . . . , m, we have 
Therefore, we can define the probabilistic integral variational inequality: Findû := u(y) ∈ M P such that for every v ∈ M P , we have
For numerical approximation of the solutionû, we begin with a discretization of the space X := L p (R d , P, R k ). For this, we introduce a sequence {π n } n of partitions of the support
of the probability measure P induced by the random elements R, S, and D. For this, we set
These partitions give rise to the exhausting sequence {ϒ n } of subsets of ϒ, where each ϒ n is given by the finite disjoint union of the intervals:
, where we use the multi-index h = (h 1 , · · · , h m ) and
For each n ∈ N, we consider the space of the R l -valued step functions (l ∈ N) on ϒ n , extended by 0 outside of ϒ n :
where 1 I denotes the {0, 1}-valued characteristic function of a subset I.
To approximate an arbitrary function w ∈ L p (R d , P, R), we employ the mean value truncation operator µ n 0 associated to the partition π n given by The basic property of the mean value truncation operator is expressed in the following lemma (see [17] ).
Lemma 4.1 For any fixed l
To construct approximations for
we introduce the orthogonal projector q : (r, s,t) ∈ R d → t ∈ R m and define for each elementary cell I n jkh ,
This leads to the following sequence of convex and closed sets of the polyhedral type:
It has been proven (see [17] ) that the sequence {M n P } approximate the set M P in the sense of Mosco ( [25] ). In order to to approximate the random variables R and S, we introduce
Combining the above ingredients, for n ∈ N, we consider the following discretized variational inequality: Findû n :=û n (y) ∈ M n P such that for every v n ∈ M n P , we have
(13) It turns out that (13) can be split in a finite number of finite dimensional variational inequalities: For every n ∈ N, and for every j, k, h findû n jkh ∈ M n jkh such that
where 
Clearly, we haveû
Now, we can state the following convergence result (whose proof can be found in [19] ).
Theorem 4.1 Assume that F(ω, ·)
is strongly monotone uniformly with respect to ω ∈ Ω. Then the sequenceû n generated by the substitute problems in (13) converges strongly in L p (R d , P, R k ) for n → ∞ to the unique solutionû of (11).
Remark 4.1 Looking carefully at the proof in [19], we can deduce that if the uniform strong monotonicity hypothesis is not satisfied, and F is only monotone, but we know that the solution is unique we obtain weak convergence ofû n toû. This implies convergence of the approximate mean values to the exact mean value of the solution.

The stochastic oligopoly model
In this section, we propose a model of oligopolistic market with uncertain data and show that the theoretical and numerical tools developed in the previous sections can be successfully applied to the model. The classical oligopolistic market equilibrium problem is a Nash game with a special structure and it was first introduced by A. Cournot [10] a long time ago. Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in oligopoly theory, and many specific cases of oligopolistic markets have been studied in detail, for instance the electricity market (see e.g. [8, 9] , and [5] for a model based on real industrial data).
We consider here the case in which m players are the producers of the same commodity. The quantity produced by firm i is denoted by q i so that q ∈ R m denotes the global production vector. Let (Ω, A , P) be a probability space and for every i ∈ {1, . . . m} consider functions f i : Ω × R → R and p : Ω × R m → R. More precisely, f i (ω, q i ) represents the cost of producing the commodity for firm i, and is assumed to be, P − a.s., nonnegative, increasing and C 1 , while p(ω, q 1 + . . . + q m ) represents the demand price associated with the commodity. For P−almost every ω ∈ Ω, p is assumed nonnegative, increasing and C 1 . The resulting welfare function w i is assumed to be concave with respect to q i . We also assume that all these functions are random variables w.r.t. ω, i.e. they are measurable with respect to the probability measure P on Ω. In this way, we cover the possibility that both the production cost and the demand price are affected by a certain degree of uncertainty, or randomness. Thus, the welfare (or utility) function of player i, representing the net revenue, is given by:
Although many models assume no bounds on the production, in a more realistic model the production capability is bounded from above and we also allow these upper bounds to be random variables: 0 ≤ q i ≤ q i (ω). Thus, the specific Nash equilibrium problem associated with this model takes the following form: For P − a.e. ω ∈ Ω, find q * (ω) = (q * 1 (ω), . . . , q * m (ω)):
In order to write the equivalent variational inequality, consider,∀ω, a closed and convex subset of R m :
and define the functions
The Nash problem is then equivalent to the following variational inequality: for P−a.e. (18) is solvable for almost every ω ∈ Ω, due to the Stampacchia's theorem. In the case that the production capability is assumed unbounded some additional hypotheses (i.e. coercivity, see e.g. [24] ) have to be present to ensure the solvability of (18) .
Remark 5.1 Since F(ω, ·) is continuous, and K(ω) is convex and compact, problem
Moreover, we assume that F(ω, ·) is monotone, i.e.:
(recall that F is said to be strictly monotone if the equality holds only for q = q ′ and in this case (18) has a unique solution). It is noteworthy that some classes of utility functions widely used in the economic literature enjoy some form of monotonicity (see section 6). Now we are interested in computing statistical quantities associated with the solution q * (ω), in particular its mean value. For this purpose, in accordance with the general scheme of Section 2, we consider a Lebesgue space formulation of problems (18)
Since the stochastic oligopolistic market problem will be studied through (19), we ensure its solvability by the following theorem: Proof. Under our assumptions, F : Ω × R m → R m is a Carathéodory function and it is well known that for each measurable function u(ω), the function F(ω, u(ω)) is also measurable. Under the growth condition d) the superposition operatorF :
and is continuous, being P a probability measure. Moreover, the uniform strong monotonicity of F implies the strong monotonicity ofF. The set K P is convex, closed and (norm) bounded, hence weakly compact. Then, monotone operator theory applies and (19) admits a unique solution (see e.g. [24] for a recent survey on existence theorems which also includes the case of unbounded sets). Now, in view of the numerical approximation of the solution, we further specialize our model and assume that the random and the deterministic part of the operator can be separated. Thus, we assume that the price can be affected by two random perturbations α(ω) and S(ω) such that:
while the cost functions are of the type:
that is, the cost functions consists of a deterministic term g i and a term, (still denoted by f i with an abuse of notation), which is modulated by the random perturbation β i . Here α, β i are real random variables, with 0
As a consequence, the operator F takes the form:
Furthermore, we assume that F is uniformly strongly monotone, w i (ω, 0) ∈ L 1 (Ω), and the growth condition d) of Section 2 is satisfied. Now, according to the methodology explained in Section 3, we will work with the probability distributions induced on the images of the functions:
Thus, let y = (A, s, B, Q) and consider the probability space (R d , B, P) with d = 2 + 2m, where B is the Borel sigma-algebra on R d . In order to formulate our problem in the image space, we introduce the closed convex set K P by:
We assume that all the random variables are independent and that each probability distribution is characterized by its density ϕ. Thus, we have
where we used the compact notation ϕ x (X) =
. Thus, we obtain the following
where the symbol . This formulation is suitable for the approximation procedure based on discretization and truncation explained in Section 4.
A class of utility functions and numerical examples
In this section we consider a modified and random version of a class of utility functions introduced by Murphy, Sheraly and Soyster in [23] and successively used by other scholars. These functions generate a nonlinear monotone variational inequality on a certain L p space, where p is determined by the power law of the cost functions. The cost and demand price functions for the five-firm case in [23] are given by: Before introducing random parameters in the above functions we note that the demand price becomes unbounded when the total quantity Q approaches 0 (commodity is scarce). Although the solution Q * = 0 is never met in most examples, in order to deal with a well behaved function we consider the functional form:
where e is a small positive parameter which determines the maximum price the consumer can pay when the commodity is very scarce. In our model, we add a random perturbation r(ω) to c i , and we modulate the price function by a random function S(ω). Thus, for the general case of m firms, we introduce cost functions given by:
where b i , c i , k i are positive parameters, and demand price functions:
where 0 < s < S(ω) < s, and a is a parameter such that 0 < a < 1 ( a = 1/1.1 in [23] ). With these functions we can build the Carathéodory function F which defines the variational inequality through:
We also use the notation , q) , where G i represents the sum of the first three terms in (23) , while H i is the rest of the sum, which contains the price function. The monotonicity of F is analyzed in the following: 
Let us now consider the function Q p(ω, Q) = [S(ω)]
a Q (Q + e) a which is strictly concave on R n + , for each value of ω, with second derivative given by:
[Qp(ω, Q)] ′′ = [S(ω)] a a (a − 1)Q − 2ae (Q + e) a+2 < 0 (0 < a < 1). Hence, we get:
which will be exploited in the sequel.
To prove the strict monotonicity of H(ω, ·) for all ω we compute its Jacobian matrix:
It is useful to decompose J as follows:
where 1 denotes the m × m matrix with each entry equal to 1, I is the identity matrix and the matrix (q i ) i j has each entry of the row i equal to q i . We prove that J(ω, Q) is positive definite for all ω and for all Q ≥ 0 by studying the quadratic form
From the decomposition of the J(ω, Q) we then get:
( specific application, we proposed a model of oligopolistic market with uncertain data to which the recent theory of random variational inequality ( [17, 19] ) was applied.
We also illustrated our model and the approximation procedure by means of a class of utility functions which yield to nonlinear monotone random variational inequalities. Further developments of our approach can be done in several directions: other type of probabilistic constraints could be considered instead of the "robust" pointwise constraints (see e.g. [12] ); an extension of our numerical method, for example through parallelization, is desirable and would permit the treatement of problems with a larger number of independent random variables; at last, the theory and computation of the stochastic Lagrange multipliers associated to SNEPs in Lebesgue spaces is a topic that has been adressed only recently ( [20] ) in a simplified model and only from a theoretical point of view.
